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INTRODUCTION
When interpreting treaties signed between the United States and Indian nations
or statutes enacted for the regulations or the benefit of Indians and Indian nations,
courts are supposed to apply the Indian canons of treaty and statutory construction.1
There are arguably five such canons. First, there is the treaty interpretation canon:
When a court is interpreting an Indian treaty, the treaty “must be interpreted in light
of the parties' intentions, with any ambiguities resolved in favor of the Indians… and
the words of a treaty must be construed in the sense in which they would naturally
be understood by the Indians.”2 The second canon can be described as the treaty
abrogation canon: When the issue is whether a subsequent Act of Congress
abrogated or modified an Indian treaty, the test is whether there is clear evidence
that Congress actually considered the treaty right and decided to abrogate that right.3
*

© 2021 Alex Tallchief Skibine, S.J. Quinney Professor of Law, University of Utah
S.J. Quinney College of Law.
1
See Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1137, 1144-1156 (1990).
2
See Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct 1686, 1699 (2019) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
3
See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40 (1986), stating “where the evidence
of congressional intent to abrogate is sufficiently compelling, “the weight of authority
indicates that such an intent can also be found by a reviewing court from clear and reliable

1
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This canon could be considered a quasi-clear statement rule. Clear statement rules
are rules requiring specific language announcing the intent of Congress to interfere
with a valued norm, such as abrogating the sovereign immunity of the States.4 I
describe the Treaty abrogation rule as “quasi” because the search for “actual
consideration” can be derived not only from the text of the statute but also from its
legislative history, as was the case in Dion.5
Third: There is what could be referred to as the tribal sovereign immunity
canon, since it has basically been used by the Court only when it comes to
congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity from suit.6 That test seemed
to have been first applied by the Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez where the
Court stated “without congressional authorization, the Indian Nations are exempt
from suit. It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ’cannot be implied but
must be unequivocally expressed.’7 When it comes to interfering with tribal selfgovernment other than abrogation of sovereign immunity, such as allowing suit
against tribal officials, the Santa Clara Court phrased the test differently, refusing
to allow such suits “unless and until Congress makes clear its intention to permit the
additional intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication of such actions in a
federal forum would represent.”8 So, one test requires “unequivocal expression of
congressional intent” while the other requires only “clear” indication of
congressional intent. This Article will refer to this last canon as the tribal sovereignty
canon.
Finally, there is what can be called the Indian ambiguity canon applicable to all
statutes enacted for the benefit or regulation of Indians. As the Court put it “When
we are faced with two possible constructions, our choice between them must be
dictated by a principle deeply rooted in this Court’s Indian jurisprudence: ‘[S]tatutes
are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions
interpreted to their benefit.’”9 Note that this last canon has 2 components, the first
one is that the statute has to be “liberally construed” while the second part requires
ambiguous provisions to be interpreted for the benefit of the Indians.” The usual
meaning of a statute “being liberally construed” is that the statute has to be
interpreted to fulfil or effectuate its purpose fully.
evidence in the legislative history of a statute.” What is essential is clear evidence that
Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and
Indian treaty rights on the other and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.”
4
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). On clear statement rules, see
William N. Eskridge Jr and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev 593, 636-40 (1992).
5
See 476 U.S. 734, 740-744 (examining in details the legislative history of the Eagle
Protection Act.)
6
On the evolution of the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine see William Wood, It
wasn’t an Accident: Tribal Sovereign Immunity Story, 62 Am. U. Law. Rev 1587 (2013).
7
436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
8
Id., at 72.
9
County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992).
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While the Court is inclined to apply the first two treaty related cannons, 10 as
well as the tribal sovereign immunity canon,11 it has rarely applied the last two or
even discussed them. Thus, since 1987, the Court has decided at least 26 cases
involving Federal Indian law where the holding depended exclusively on statutory
or treaty interpretation.12 Yet, in that time period, only four cases discussed the basic
Indian canon requiring ambiguities to be resolved in the Indians’ favor and only one
invoked it in its holding.13
This Article analyzes some of these 26 Supreme Court cases to understand the
reasons for the Court’s reluctance to invoke the “ambiguity” canon of statutory
construction, including the interconnection between the canon and textualism, the
ascendant interpretive methodology.14 There is no question that one of the reasons
for the Court’s failure to invoke the Indian ambiguity canon is that it can be easily
avoided by finding no ambiguity in the statute. Thus, it may be that judges who are
faithful to textualism, with its focus on the statutory text and the plain meaning of
the words, are less likely to find ambiguities in statutes.15
10

Although as noted by Professor Richard Collins, this is not always the case. See
Richard Collins, Never Construed to their Prejudice: In Honor of David Getches, 84 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 1, 2 (2013)(stating that the Court “has ignored the canon in recent rulings”). See also
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) and discussion infra at notes…..
11
As the Court recently stated “The baseline position, we have often held, is tribal
immunity; and “[t]o abrogate [such] immunity, Congress must ‘unequivocally’ express that
purpose, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. 782, 790 (2014).
12
See, Alexander Tallchief Skibine, The Supreme Court’s Last Thirty Years of Federal
Indian Law: Looking for Equilibrium or Supremacy, 8 Colum. J. Race & L. 277 (2018). Not
taken into account are cases involving the Indian preemption doctrine discussing whether
federal law has preempted state jurisdiction in Indian Country or the cases involving
divestment of tribal jurisdiction over non-members. These cases are not included because
they were not decided exclusively on statutory grounds although statutory and treaty
construction was, obviously, a factor. See Collins, supra at n. 11, Never Construed to their
Prejudice, at pp. 50-55. See also Frickey, supra at n.1, at 1160-66.
13
This state of affairs made Professor Matthew Fletcher to recently state “[T]he reality
is that when it comes to interpreting Indian affairs statutes, the judiciary too often treats these
canons as voluntary. And if a court relies on these canons, they often do so in support of an
outcome favoring tribal interests reached on other grounds, sort of like frosting on top.” See
Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Textualism’s Gaze, 25 Mich. J. Race & L. 111, 138 (2020).
14
On the ascendancy of Textualism, see William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. Rev. 621 (1990). On Textualist methodology, see John F. Manning, Second
Generation Textualism, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1287 (2010).
15
Justice Scalia when speaking of another doctrine also requiring the finding of
ambiguity before being applied, stated
How clear is clear? . . . In my experience, there is a fairly close correlation between
the degree to which a person is (for want of a better word) a “strict
constructionist”' of statutes, and the degree to which that person favors Chevron.
. . . The reason is obvious. One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning
of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws,
thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference
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While I agree with those scholars who have noted that there is no current test
for determining whether an ambiguity exists and have argued that the focus on
ambiguity before the use of substantive canons is misplaced, 16 this ambiguity
dilemma could have been partially attenuated if the courts had more scrupulously
applied the “liberally construed” requirement or the “Tribal sovereignty” canon.
Because the Court basically ignores these two rules of construction, this Article
argues that although there may be a pragmatic reason for treating sovereign
immunity differently than other interferences with tribal sovereignty or selfgovernment, 17 there are no normative reasons for doing so. In other words,
Congressional intent to interfere with tribal sovereignty should also be in the words
of the Santa Clara Court “unequivocally expressed.” The difference between “clear
indication” and “unequivocal expression” may sound like a matter of semantics but
the fact remains that the Sovereign Immunity canon is being applied while the
Sovereignty canon is not. If there is a difference, it may be that “unequivocal
expression” of congressional intent has more of a textualist bend than “clear
indication.” Hopefully, looking for “unequivocal expression” will make judges
focus on the text of the statute and not on extra textual material to find such clear
indication of congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign rights.18
In PART I, after explaining why the Indian canons are normative canons that
should be applied in the interpretation of statutes enacted for the benefit or regulation
of Indians, I survey some cases decided by the Supreme Court on statutory or treaty
interpretation grounds since 1987. After arguing that the reservation
disestablishment cases should be considered treaty abrogation cases, this Part
concludes by identifying some of the cases that should have been decided differently
had the Court applied the Indian canon of statutory construction under which statutes
enacted for the benefit of Indians should be liberally construed with ambiguous
provisions resolved to the benefit of the Indians.
In Part II, I delve into the textualist perspective on applying substantive canons.
This theme was more recently taken up by Justice Cavanaugh in an article written

exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept an
interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally adopt.
1989 Duke L.J. 511, 520–21. In the same article, Scalia goes on stating “Contrariwise, one
who abhors a “plain meaning” rule, and is willing to permit the apparent meaning of a statute
to be impeached by the legislative history, will more frequently find agency-liberating
ambiguity, and will discern a much broader range of “‘reasonable”’ interpretation.” Id.
16
See Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons,
Stare Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity in the Administrative State, 69 Md. L. Rev.
791 (2010).
17
The pragmatic reason is that “sovereign immunity” is a discrete and well-defined
area while tribal sovereignty is not.
18
It should be noted that there is a current debate on what constitutes “unequivocal
expression” to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in the context of the Bankruptcy Act. See
Michael Bevilacqua, Silent Intent? Analyzing the congressional intent required to abrogate
tribal sovereign immunity, 61 B.C. L. Rev. E-Supplement II-156 (2020).
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before he joined the Court.19 Justice Cavanaugh argued that judges should, as much
as possible, shy away from making determinations that statutes are ambiguous
because a finding of ambiguity allows judges to “resort to a variety of canons of
construction” 20 which Kavanaugh finds troubling. Coincidentally, the idea that
textualist judges should be reluctant to use “substantive” or “normative” canons was
also considered by another future Supreme Court Justice, Amy Coney Barrett. In a
2010 Article, she explained that textualist judges are reluctant to use these
substantive canons because they conflict with the role of judges as “faithful agents”
of the Legislature in that these canons reflect extra textual norms which in all
likelihood were not in the mind of those who drafted the legislation at issue.21 In this
article, I explain why, when it comes to the Indian canons, such reluctance is
misplaced. Thus, I argue that the Indian canons have constitutional roots and have
the same legitimacy as federalist canons.22
Finally, I conclude by presenting an argument that the test applicable to
abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity should be applicable to any statute
abrogating tribal sovereign rights. This Article concludes by discussing the limits of
the Indian canons’ applicability.
PART I: THE INDIAN CANONS OF S TATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A. Background Principles and Normative Reasons for the Indian Canons
Whether one is a textualist looking for the meaning of a text or a
purposivist/intentionalist looking for the purpose or intent of Congress in
interpreting a text,23 courts use canons of statutory construction to determine what
Congress meant or had in mind when it used a specific term or phrase. Substantive
or normative canons create background norms to help the interpreter decide the
meaning that should be given to the words of a statute. As Professor Frickey noted,
normative canons “[G]o outside the document and create an exception to the basic
interpretive approach for cases that implicate certain important values. In most
instances, these policy based canons operate either as tiebreakers at the end of the
19
Brett M. Kavanaugh, reviewing Robert Katzmann’s book, Fixing Statutory
Interpretation, Judging Statutes, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118 (2016).
20
Id., at 2134-2135.
21
See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev.
109 (2010).
22
On Federalist canons, see John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the
Constitution,110 Colum. L. Rev. 399 (2010).
23
As stated by now Justice Coney Barret, “Purposivism, the classical approach to
statutory interpretation, claims that a judge should be faithful to Congress's presumed intent
rather than to the statutory text when the two appear to diverge. Textualism, by contrast,
maintains that the statutory text is the only reliable indication of congressional intent.” Amy
Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 112 (2010).
See also John F. Manning, What Divides Textualist from Purposivists? 106 Colum. L. Rev.
70 (2006).
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basic interpretive analysis or as rebuttable presumptions at the outset of the
interpretive process.”24
When it comes to federal Indian law, the first canons were developed in
connection with interpreting treaties signed between the United States and Indian
nations. According to Professor Philip Frickey, Justice Marshall in Worcester v.
Georgia grounded the Court’s interpretation of the treaty with the Cherokees in the
value of structural sovereignty, viewing the Cherokee treaties as organic documents
integrating that Indian Nation into the United States.25 From that original case, the
Court eventually adopted the rule that treaty terms had to be construed the way the
Indians would have naturally understood them at the time of the signing. 26 As
recently stated by the Court:” Indian treaties “must be interpreted in light of the
parties' intentions, with any ambiguities resolved in favor of the Indians, and the
words of a treaty must be construed in the sense in which they would naturally be
understood by the Indians.”27
Although Worcester involved the interpretation of a treaty, the Court in Choate
v. Trapp,28 extended the reasoning of Worcester to the interpretation of statutes
enacted specifically for the benefit of Indians. The issue in Choate was whether the
State of Oklahoma could tax Indian lands, and the ambiguity derived from what
appeared to be conflicting statutes. Acknowledging the “general rule that tax
exemptions are to be strictly construed,” the Court nevertheless ruled in favor of the
Indians because “[I]n the Government’s dealings with the Indians the rule is exactly
the contrary. The construction, instead of being strict, is liberal; doubtful
expressions, instead of being resolved in favor of the United States, are to be
resolved in favor of a weak and defenseless people, who are wards of the nation.”29
The Choate Court claimed that “This rule of construction has been recognized,
without exception, for more than a hundred years,” 30 although it did not provide any
citations for this claim.
While Choate and some other early cases rely on similarly outdated “weak and
defenseless” rationales to explain the canon, scholars have shown that the Court
24

See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 414
(1993).
25
See Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present, at 408-411. The major issue in Worcester
was whether Georgia could assert jurisdiction over Cherokee territory because the Cherokee
Nation had, in treaties with the United States, ceded all of its sovereign power. The Court
refused to allow Georgia jurisdiction, holding that the Cherokee Nation was still a sovereign
Indian Nation.
26
The first mention that ambiguous provisions should be construed in favor of the
Indians was articulated by Justice McLean in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 582, (1832)
(concurring opinion) (“The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be
construed to their prejudice”).
27
Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1698–99
28
224 U.S. 655 (1912)
29
Id. at 674-75; See also, Alaskan Pac. Fisheries v. U.S., 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918).
30
224 U.S. 655 at 675.
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eventually used the same kind of reasoning initially applied to treaty abrogation to
make sure that statutes did not unintentionally abrogate tribal rights in non-treaty
interpretation contexts. 31 Many commentators refer to the Indian canon as the
Blackfeet canon or the Blackfeet presumption. In Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe,32
which concerned whether the State could tax tribal royalties from oil and gas leases
under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 33 the State invoked the presumption
against implied repeals to argue that its taxation power remained intact. The Court
disagreed, stating: ”The State fails to appreciate, however, that the standard
principles of statutory construction do not have their usual force in cases involving
Indian law. As we said earlier this Term, “[t]he canons of construction applicable in
Indian law are rooted in the unique trust relationship between the United States and
the Indians.”34 A few years later, in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, the Court followed the Blackfeet canon when
stating “When we are faced with two possible constructions, our choice between
them must be dictated by a principle deeply rooted in this Court’s Indian
jurisprudence: ‘[S]tatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with
ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.”35
In an article written before she joined the Supreme Court, Justice Connie
Barrett mentioned that although the Indian canon started with interpretation of
Indian treaties, it migrated to statutes without any real explanations.36 She noted that
only one lower court had at the time stated that the treaty rule became applicable to
statutes because Congress stopped making treaties with Indian tribes and instead
started regulating them through statutes.37 The problem here is that, although she
cited to Professor Frickey’s scholarship in this area, Coney Barrett attributed the
origin of the Indian canon of treaty interpretation to contract law principles under
which the benefit of the doubt is given to the less sophisticated party.38 In effect,
Professor Frickey reached the opposite conclusion, stating that “A theory of
sovereignty, then, rather than contract, better explains Chief Justice Marshall’s
interpretation in Worcester.”39
This Article endorses Professor Frickey’s argument that Marshall’s treaty
interpretation methodology was similar to constitutional interpretation because
31
See, Frickey Marshalling Past and Present, supra at note… at 416-417. See also,
Collins, Never Construed to their Prejudice, supra at note 11, at 21-25, Scott C Hall, The
Indian Canons of Construction v. the Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent and the
Unambiguous Answer to the Ambiguous Problem, 37 Conn L. Rev. 495, 538-543 (2004).
32
471 U.S. 759 (1985).
33
25 U.S.C §§ 396a-396g
34
Id. at 766 (quoting Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247
(1985))
35
502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992).
36
Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 109,
151-152 (2010).
37
Id., citing Conway v. United States 149 F. 261, 265-66 (C.C.D. Nev. 1907).
38
Id., at 152.
39
Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present, at 407.
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Chief Justice Marshall considered the treaties as documents incorporating Indian
tribes into the United States political system, 40 although Justice Cony Barrett is
correct that contract interpretation theory also played a role in the origin of the
canon. 41 The objection that could be raised, however, is that while treaties are
documents of incorporation, statutes are not, so the rules of interpretations applying
to treaties should not apply to Indian statutes. Yet, as stated by Justice O’Connor
“‘[R]ooted in the unique trust relationship between the United States and the
Indians,’ the Indian canon presumes congressional intent to assist its wards to
overcome the disadvantages our country has placed upon them. Consistent with this
purpose, the Indian canon applies to statutes as well as treaties: The form of the
enactment does not change the presumption.” 42 As explained in PART II, this
Article takes the position that the Indian canons of construction are constitutionally
based because the trust relationship has constitutional roots.43
It is because the Indian canons of statutory construction are “rooted in the
unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians,” that it can be
considered a normative or substantive canon. The Indian canon is normative because
it recognizes that the trust relationship constitutes a background norm that should be
respected when interpreting statutes enacted pursuant to Congress’s role as trustee
for the tribes. Thus, if the purpose of using a canon is to determine what Congress
meant when it used particular words or phrasing in a statute, the Indian canon fulfills
this function by presuming that when enacting statutes for the benefit of Indians,
Congress acted pursuant to this trust relationship and would not want such a statute
to be construed to the detriment of Indian tribes. In that manner, applying the canon
is necessary to the Court’s role as a “faithful agent” of Congress. 44 Thus, because
40
Id., at 408-411. For justifying treaty interpretation favoring Indians on a slightly
different theory, see Note, Indian Canon Originalism, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1100 (2013).
41
For another scholar acknowledging that fact See Collins, Never Construed to their
Prejudice, supra at n. 11 at p. 5-9.
42
534 U.S. 84, 99–100 (2001).
43
For an argument attempting to justify the Indian statutory canons on a theory of
democratic deficit, see Collins, Never construed to their Prejudice, supra at note 11 at pp.2526, (stating ”[d]emocratic deficit is a strong reason for courts to insist that Congress spell out
legislative impairments of Indian rights…during most of our history, Congress acted with
virtually no Indian influence and often in response to Indians' powerful enemies. Thus, when
courts interpret statutes adopted under those conditions, the democratic deficit ought to
support a strong statutory canon.) For a normative argument tying statutory interpretation in
Indian cases to the fact that Indian tribes never consented to come under the plenary power
of Congress, see David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest,
Consent, and Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 Va. L. Rev. 403 (1994) (stating “[e]ven
if the courts accept congressional power as a brute fact imposed on them by the Constitution
or institutional necessity, they must still seek a reason justifying that power in order to
provide themselves with a lodestar to guide interpretation.” Id., at 415.
44
On courts being the faithful agents of Congress, see generally Coney Barrett,
Substantive Canons, supra at note… stating “The view that federal courts function as the
faithful agents of Congress is a conventional one. Throughout most of the twentieth century,
participants in debates about statutory interpretation largely subscribed to it; the disputes
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Congress is acting pursuant to the trust relationship in enacting Indian related
legislation, it would naturally expect the statute to be interpreted to the benefit of the
Indians.
B. The Court’s Treaty and Statutory Interpretation Cases Since 1987
1. The Treaty Cases
There are two types of treaty cases: the treaty interpretation cases, and the treaty
abrogation cases. Treaty abrogation cases are controlled by the test enunciated in
United States v. Dion. 45 That test requires clear evidence that Congress actually
considered the treaty right in question and opted to abrogate or modify it. 46 Tribal
interests won four of the treaty cases decided in the last thirty years, all won by tribal
interests in 5-4 decisions. The tribal position lost one case, South Dakota v.
Bourland, 47 a treaty abrogation case involving a tribal attempt to control nonmembers hunting and fishing within the exterior boundaries of the reservation.
The issue in Bourland was whether the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe had kept
its treaty right to exclude non-members on land that was within the reservation but
had been taken from the tribe for a federal dam and reservoir project.48 The Court
in an opinion authored by Justice Thomas held that the Tribe’s treaty right to exclude
non-members from the reservation, implicit in its rights of “absolute and undisturbed
use and occupation,” of such lands, as well as its derivative right to regulate nonmembers while on these lands, was implicitly abrogated when the United States took
the lands from the Tribe, assumed control over such lands, and opened them for the
use of the general public.49
Justice Thomas insisted that his analysis was not in conflict with United States
v. Dion.50 Thomas concluded, however, that he could not explain Section 10 of the
Cheyenne River Act and section 4 of the Flood Control Act except as “indications
that Congress sought to divest the Tribe of its right to “absolute use and
occupation.”51 That conclusion was strongly objected to by the dissent which stated
that the majority “points not even to a scrap of evidence that Congress actually

centered around how best to implement it. The rival theories in this regard were - and remain
- purposivism and textualism. Id., at 112
45
476 U.S. 734 (1986).
46
Id., at 738-40. Stating that there has to be “clear evidence that Congress actually
considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights
on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.”
47 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
48 Id., at 681-682.
49
Id., at 690.
50
476 U.S. 734 (1986).
51
508 U.S. at 693.
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considered the possibility that by taking the land in question it would deprive the
Tribe of its authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on that land.” 52 The
Dissent also remarked that although the Court acknowledged the application of cases
like Dion to this case, “the majority adopts precisely the sort of reasoning-byimplication that those cases reject.”53
In Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa, 54 one important issue was
whether certain hunting, fishing, and gathering rights guaranteed to the Chippewas
in a 1837 treaty were terminated either by an 1850 Executive Order, a subsequent
treaty signed with the Tribe in 1855, or when Minnesota entered the Union in 1858.
The Court ruled that none of these actions abrogated or terminated the Tribe’s treaty
rights. The Court followed Dion and held that there was no “‘clear evidence that
Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one
hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by
abrogating the treaty.”55
Herrera v. Wyoming,56 was both a treaty abrogation and a treaty interpretation
case. Concerning treaty abrogation, the major issue was whether in enacting the
Wyoming Statehood Act, Congress intended to end the Crow Tribe’s hunting rights
guaranteed in a 1868 Treaty. The treaty had a clause authorizing tribal members to
continue hunting “on the unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game may
be found thereon ... and peace subsists ... on the borders of the hunting districts.” 57
The Court noted that the Wyoming Statehood Act made no mention of Indian treaty
rights and provides no clue that Congress considered the Tribe’s rights and decided
to abrogate them when enacting the law. As the Court put it, “There simply is no
evidence that Congress intended to abrogate the 1868 Treaty right through the
Wyoming Statehood Act, much less the “ ‘clear evidence’ ” this Court's precedent
requires.”58 In other words, the Court again performed a straightforward application
of the Dion test.
On the treaty interpretation matter, the issue was whether the Crow Tribe at the
time of signing the treaty understood the 1868 treaty to expire at statehood. Taking
the position that a treaty is a contract between two sovereign nations, the Court stated
that Indian treaties “must be interpreted in light of the parties' intentions, with any
ambiguities resolved in favor of the Indians… and the words of a treaty must be
construed “‘in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by the
Indians.’59 The Court concluded that there was nothing in the text of the 1868 Treaty

52

Id., at 700 (Blackmun and Souter dissenting.)
Id.
54
526 U.S. 172 (1999).
55
Id., at 202–203, (quoting Dion, 476 U.S. at 740).
56
139 S. Ct 1686 (2019).
57
15 Stat. 650.
58
139 S. Ct at 1698.
59
Id., at 1699.
53
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with the Crow Tribe that even suggested that the parties intended the hunting right
to expire at statehood.60
Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den,61 was another 5-4
decision, this one involving a matter of treaty interpretation. The issue was whether
the State could impose on Cougar Den, a Yakama tribal entity, a fuel tax levied and
imposed upon motor vehicle fuel licensees for each gallon of motor vehicle fuel that
the licensee brings into the State. Cougar Den argued that the state fuel tax was
preempted by a clause in the Yakama Treaty of 1855 that reserved to tribal members
“the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public
highways.”62
In upholding Cougar Den’s claim, Justice Breyer for the Court followed the
Indian canons of treaty interpretation, stating “When we're dealing with a tribal
treaty, too, we must “give effect to the terms as the Indians themselves would have
understood them.” 63 Breyer then gave his reasons for the canon by noting that it was
the United States who wrote this “contract,” and any ambiguities in contracts are
usually construed against the drafter.64
There was one unusual case decided in 2001 that fell in between treaty and
statutory interpretation. The issue in Idaho v. United States, 65 was whether the
United States intended the land underneath Lake Coeur d’Alene to transfer to the
State of Idaho upon Statehood. Pursuant to former “agreements” with the Lac Coeur
d’Alene Tribe, the lake had been originally included as part of the tribal
reservation. 66 Because this involved land underneath navigable waters that are
presumed to transfer to the state upon statehood, slightly different rules of
interpretation applied. Thus the Court in this 5 to 4 decision never mentioned any
canons in favor of Indians or brought in rules of treaty interpretation and stated
The issue of congressional intent is refined somewhat when submerged
lands are located within a tract that the National Government has dealt
with in some special way before statehood, as by reserving lands for a
particular national purpose such as a wildlife refuge or, as here, an Indian
reservation. Because reserving submerged lands does not necessarily
imply the intent “to defeat a future State's title to the land,” we undertake
a two-step enquiry in reservation cases. We ask whether Congress
60

Id.
139 S. Ct. 1000 (2020).
62
Treaty Between the United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians, June 9, 1855,
12 Stat. 951, at 953.
63
Id., at 1021.
64
Id., Breyer also mentioned that “Nor is there any question that the government
employed that power to its advantage in this case. During the negotiations “English words
were translated into Chinook jargon ... although that was not the primary language” of the
Tribe. After the parties reached agreement, the U.S. negotiators wrote the treaty in English—
a language that the Yakamas couldn't read or write.” Id.
65
533 U.S. 262 (2001)
66
Id., at 266.
61
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intended to include land under navigable waters within the federal
reservation and, if so, whether Congress intended to defeat the future
State's title to the submerged lands. 67

In the end, the Court found that Congress never intended to modify the agreement
negotiated with the Tribe, stating “Any imputation to Congress either of bad faith or
of secrecy in dropping its express objective of consensual dealing with the Tribe is
at odds with the evidence.”68
Except for Bourland, all these treaty or quasi treaty cases were won by the tribes
and the Court faithfully applied the appropriate canons. This was not the cases for
the next types of cases analyzed in the next Section of this Article.
2. The Reservation Disestablishment Cases: Treaty Abrogation Cases or
Something Else?
These cases ask whether subsequent legislation enacted pursuant to the General
Allotment Act of 1884, 69 and allowing non-Indians to purchase “surplus” land
within an allotted Indian reservation, disestablished the borders of that reservation.
There has been four of these cases since 1987: Hagen v. Utah,70 South Dakota v.
Yankton Sioux Tribe,71 Nebraska v. Parker,72 and McGirt v. Oklahoma.73 Officially,
all four cases applied the test the Court had established in Solem v. Bartlett,74 a 1984
case. The Court in Solem stated “Diminishment… will not be lightly inferred. Our
analysis of surplus land Acts requires that Congress clearly evince an ‘intent ... to
change ... boundaries' before diminishment will be found.”75 Although the Court
seemed to adopt a “clear evidence” standard similar to the one adopted in Dion, that
was far from the case. Thus, if the words of the statute failed to demonstrate such
clear intent, a court could also look at events surrounding the passage of the Act to
see if they “unequivocally reveal a widely held contemporaneous understanding that
the affected reservation would shrink as a result of the proposed legislation....”76 If
“contemporaneous events” were not enough to reveal a clear indication of
congressional intent, a court could analyze “events that occurred after the passage
of a surplus land Act to decipher congressional intent.” 77 Finally, if these
“subsequent events” did not show clear congressional intent, a court could look at

67

Id., at 280.
Id., at 281.
69
Pub. L. 49-105.
70
510 U.S. 399 (1994).
71
522 U.S. 329 (1998)
72
136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).
73
140 S. Ct. 2452, 2462 (2020).
74
465 U.S. 463 (1984)
75
Id., at 470.
76
Id., at 471
77
Id.
68
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“who actually moved onto opened reservation lands” since this “is also relevant in
deciding whether a surplus land act diminished a reservation.”78
Among the four cases, Yankton was the only one that mentioned Dion but did
not further elaborate. 79 Nor did it follow Dion’s methodology. In Yankton, the
Yankton tribe was attempting to regulate a solid waste disposal facility owned by a
non-Indian. The non-Indian argued that the tribe did not have jurisdiction because
the waste facility was not within the reservation. The Court agreed, finding that
congressional intent to diminish the part of the reservation where the facility was
located was clear from the “plain statutory language.”80 Key to the Court’s finding
of clarity was that the legislation provided that the Tribe shall “cede, sell, and
relinquish to the United States all their claim, right, and interest to all the unallotted
lands within the limits of the reservation,” for a sum certain which was $600,000.81
In Hagen,82 the State of Utah was trying to prosecute an Indian for distributing
a controlled substance. The Indian argued the State had no jurisdiction over him
because the crime had been committed within the reservation. The Court disagreed
finding that this part of the reservation had been disestablished. Just as in Yankton,
the Court found clear indication of congressional intent because the statute at issue
had used certain key words such as having the lands relinquished by the Tribe
“returned to the public domain.” The Hagen dissent eloquently summarized the
applicable law in disagreeing with the majority’s methodology
Two rules of construction govern our interpretation of Indian surplus-land
statutes: we must find clear and unequivocal evidence of congressional
intent to reduce reservation boundaries, and ambiguities must be construed
broadly in favor of the Indians…. In diminishment cases, the rule that
“legal ambiguities are resolved to the benefit of the Indians” also must be
given “the broadest possible scope… Although the majority purports to
apply these canons in principle, it ignores them in practice, resolving every
ambiguity in the statutory language, legislative history, and surrounding
circumstances in favor of the State and imputing to Congress, where no
clear evidence of congressional intent exists, an intent to diminish the
Uintah Valley Reservation.83
Both Hagen and Yankton claimed to look for clear evidence of congressional intent
but found such clarity by arbitrarily claiming that some “magic words” such as
“cede, sell, and relinquish” or “lands returned to the public domain” were code for
“the reservations is hereby diminished, reduced, or terminated.”
78

Id.
522 U.S. 329, 343. The Court just stated “Only Congress can alter the terms of an
Indian treaty by diminishing a reservation, and its intent to do so must be “clear and
plain,” United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738–739.
80
Id., at 344-45.
81
522 U.S. at 351
82
510 U.S. 399 (1994).
83
Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 422–24 (1994)(Justice Blackmun dissenting).
79
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Parker and McGirt, both finding no disestablishments, could be interpreted as
moving away from the Solem methodology although both pretended to follow it.
Professor Matthew Fletcher in a recent Article noted that Parker reflected closer
fidelity to textualism by only engaging with the text of the statutes and putting “an
end to much of that nonsense” that had been generated under the Solem
methodology. 84 For sure, Justice Thomas rejected sole reliance on extra textual
materials. Thus, on the subsequent treatment of the area by the federal government,
he stated that while the Court could consider such treatment “our cases suggest that
such evidence might “reinforc[e]” a finding of diminishment or nondiminishment
based on the text… But this Court has never relied solely on this third consideration
to find diminishment…” 85 As to the subsequent demographic history of the
reservation, Thomas concluded that it “cannot overcome our conclusion
that Congress did not intend to diminish the reservation in 1882. And it is not our
role to “rewrite” the 1882 Act in light of this subsequent demographic history.”86
McGirt v. Oklahoma continued the trend away from the Solem methodology. 87
Justice Gorsuch for the majority reaffirmed the Parker’s position that extratextual
evidence could not be conclusive when it came to holding a reservation
disestablished, stating
Oklahoma and the dissent have cited no case in which this Court has found
a reservation disestablished without first concluding that a statute required
that result. Perhaps they wish this case to be the first. To follow Oklahoma
and the dissent down that path, though, would only serve to allow States
and courts to finish work Congress has left undone, usurp the legislative
function in the process, and treat Native American claims of statutory right
as less valuable than others.88
While both Parker and McGirt can be viewed as decisions applying textualism to
the Tribes’ advantage, the disestablishment cases should have been viewed as treaty
abrogation cases from the beginning and not just statutory interpretation cases. As
is the case with treaty abrogation, statutes affecting reservation boundaries should
have required clear evidence that Congress actually considered modifying the
original reservation boundaries and opted to diminish such reservation. Perhaps the
McGirt textualist methodology will amount to the same thing. Time will tell.
The reason for the initial error in not considering such cases treaty abrogation
cases could be traced to the fact that although most reservations were established by
Fletcher, Textualism’s Gaze, 25 Mich. J. Race & Law 111, at 121-122.
136 S. Ct. 1072, 1081.
86
Id., at 1081-1082.
87
As the McGirt dissenters stated “Today the Court does not even discuss the governing
approach reiterated throughout these precedents. The Court briefly recites the general rule
that disestablishment requires clear congressional “intent,” but the Court then declines to
examine the categories of evidence that our precedents demand we consider.” McGirt v.
Oklahoma, 140 S.Ct. 2452, 2486–87(2020).
88
Id., at 2470.
84
85
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treaties, the statutes opening the reservations to non-Indians did not “directly”
abrogate treaties because such treaty established borders had already been modified
by other Acts of Congress that had reduced the original size of the treaty
reservations. These Acts of Congress in turn were further modified by subsequent
legislation opening-up the reservations for non-Indian settlement pursuant to the
General Allotment Act.
For instance, the first two cases considering disestablishment were non-treaty
cases in that the reservations were established by Acts of Congress and not treaties.89
The third case, DeCoteau v. District Court,90 was different in that even though the
original reservation was set up by treaty, the Act that was held to disestablish the
reservation was enacted to implement a 1889 agreement with the Tribe.91 The Court
mentioned the Indian canon under which ‘legal ambiguities are resolved to the
benefit of the Indians,”92 but not the treaty abrogation canon requiring clear evidence
of actual consideration to abrogate the treaty.
The fourth case, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, also involved amendments to
the 1889 Act,93 even though the reservation of the Rosebud Sioux was originally
established in a 1868 treaty.94 Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, noted that
the resolution of the case hinged on congressional intent but that such intent can be
derived from “‘the face of the Act,’ the ‘surrounding circumstances,’ and the
‘legislative history,’” 95 Although Rehnquist found such clear evidence of
congressional intent to disestablish the reservation, the dissent criticized the majority
noting that the Court held the reservation disestablished “when the evidence
concerning congressional intent is palpably ambiguous.”96
In conclusion, it seems that the Solem methodology was in effect not applied in
Parker and McGirt which emphasized finding clear evidence of congressional intent
from the text of the statutes and not from extra textual evidence. Hopefully,
Professor Flether’s assessment that these two cases put an end to much of the
nonsense generated by the previous decisions in this area will prove correct.97
3. Non-Treaty Cases Mentioning (or Not) the Indian Ambiguity Canon of
Statutory Construction
Although there are four cases mentioning this Indian canon, only one, County
of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, actually

89

See Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962), Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481,
505 (1973).
90
420 U.S. 425 (1975).
91
24 Stat. 896.
92
Id., at 447.
93
430 U.S. 584.
94
Treaty of April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635.3
95
430 U.S. at 587.
96
Id., at 618.
97
See discussion supra at note 74.
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applied the canon.98 Another one mentioned it but only for the purpose of discarding
it.99 The other two cases involved dissenting opinions.100
County of Yakima involved state taxation of land inside the Yakima Indian
reservation that had been initially assigned to individual Indians during the
Allotment process but had subsequently been taken out of trust status and were now
owned in fee simple.101 The Court, per Justice Scalia, held that while the General
Allotment Act permitted the County to impose an ad valorem tax on reservation land
patented in fee pursuant to the Act, it did not allow the county to enforce its excise
tax on sales of such land. On that issue, the Court stated that while “taxation of land”
could be construed to include “taxation of the proceeds from sale of land,” this was
not the phrase's “unambiguous meaning.” 102 Finding ambiguity, the Court stated
“When we are faced with these two possible constructions, our choice between them
must be dictated by a principle deeply rooted in this Court's Indian jurisprudence:
“[S]tatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous
provisions interpreted to their benefit.” 103
The County of Yakima Court did not consider the Indian canon when it came to
taxation of the land itself because the Indian General Allotment Act authorized
taxation of fee-patented land and such taxing power had been explicitly confirmed
in the 1906 Burke Act which amended the General Allotment Act.104 The Burke Act
provided that upon issuance of the fee patent by the Secretary of the Interior “all
restrictions as to ... taxation of said land shall be removed.”105 Thus, the Court found
unmistakably clear expression of congressional intent to authorize state taxation of
Indian lands.106
Justice Blackmun disagreed with that part of the majority opinion, stating “To
be sure, the proviso could be read to suggest that Congress possibly intended
taxation of allotted lands other than those lands patented prematurely. But a

98

502 U.S. 251 (1992).
Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993),
100
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001), Carcieri v. Salazar. 555
U.S. 379 (2009).
101
The General Allotment Act of 1887, Pub. L. 49-105. See discussion at note 63.
102
502 U.S. at 268-269 (Remarking that the Supreme Court had once before taken the
position that “a tax upon the sale of property is not a tax upon the subject matter of that sale,”
Citing to Mahler v. Tremper, 243 P.2d 627, 629 (1952).
103
502 U.S. 251, at 269.
104
Id., at 263-264, stating “Thus, when § 5 rendered the allotted lands alienable and
encumberable, it also rendered them subject to assessment and forced sale for taxes.”
105
See 24 Stat. 388 as amended.
106
Id., at 259 stating “we agree with the Court of Appeals that by specifically
mentioning immunity from land taxation “as one of the restrictions that would be removed
upon conveyance in fee,” Congress in the Burke Act proviso “manifest[ed] a clear intention
to permit the state to tax” such Indian lands.”) For a critique of that part of Justice Scalia’s
opinion, see David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent,
and Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 Va. L. Rev. 403, 430-441 (1994).
99
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possibility, or even a likelihood, does not meet this Court's demanding standard of
“unmistakably clear” intent.”107
In Negonsott v. Samuels,108 a tribal member accused of a crime was arguing that
a federal law did not give the State of Kansas jurisdiction over reservation Indians
and that any ambiguity in the legislation should be resolved in his favor.109 The
Court rejected his argument. Concerning the Indian canon that laws passed for the
benefit Tribes are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in
favor of the Indians, the Court stated “It is not entirely clear to us that the Kansas
Act is a statute “passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes.” But if it does fall
into that category… We see no reason to equate “benefit of dependent Indian tribes,”
… with “benefit of accused Indian criminals.”110 The Court went on to hold that
since the statute was unambiguous in conferring Kansas jurisdiction over major
offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations, this was not a case
calling for the application of the Indian canon of construction.111
Another case where the Indian Ambiguity canon was discussed by the Court
was Chickasaw Nation v. United States.112 At issue in the case was a provision of
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act stating “The provisions of [the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986] (including … chapter 35 of such [Code]) concerning the reporting
and withholding of taxes …shall apply to Indian gaming operations… in the same
manner as such provisions apply to State gaming and wagering operations.”113 The
problem was that Chapter 35 did not concern itself with the reporting or
the withholding of taxes but only imposed taxes related to gambling while
exempting certain state-controlled gambling activities.
The Tribes argued that the Indian Gaming Act’s subsection exempted them
from paying those chapter 35 taxes from which States were exempted. The Court
did not agree, holding that the Tribes treatment like States ended with “reporting and
withholding” activities. 114 Concerning the Indian canon, the Court stated “[t]he
canon that assumes Congress intends its statutes to benefit the tribes is offset by the
canon that warns us against interpreting federal statutes as providing tax exemptions
unless those exemptions are clearly expressed. Nor can one say that the pro-Indian
canon is inevitably stronger—particularly where the interpretation of a
congressional statute rather than an Indian treaty is at issue.”115
The dissent per Justice O’Connor agreed that there were some contradictions
within the statute but argued that since nothing in the text or legislative history
resolved the ambiguity, this made the case appropriate for the invocation of
substantive canons of statutory construction, including “the Indian canon that
107

502 U.S. 251, 272 (1992).
507 U.S. 99 (1993).
109
18 U.S.C. 3243.
110
507 U.S. 99, 110 (1993).
111
Id.
112
534 U.S. 84 (2001)
113
25 U.S.C. 2719(d)(1).
114
534 U.S. at 89-90.
115
Id., at 95.
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“statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous
provisions interpreted to their benefit.”116 She concluded that “because Congress has
chosen gaming as a means of enabling the Nations to achieve self-sufficiency, the
Indian canon rightly dictates that Congress should be presumed to have intended the
Nations to receive more, rather than less, revenue from this enterprise.”117
Carcieri v. Salazar 118 was another case where the majority purported to find a
statute to be unambiguous, 119 while the dissent stated that the Court’s “cramped
reading of a statute intended to be sweeping in scope…ignores the “principle deeply
rooted in [our] Indian jurisprudence” that “statutes are to be construed liberally in
favor of the Indians.”120 This case is perhaps the most egregious example among
federal Indian law cases when it comes to arbitrarily declaring that a statute is
unambiguously clear when in fact, it was far from it. At issue in Carcieri was
whether Tribes that were not under federal jurisdiction as of 1934 could still benefit
from a provision in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 allowing the Secretary to
take land in trust for Indians or Indian tribes.121 Section 479 defined “Indian” to
“include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian
tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.”
For over fifty years, the Department of the Interior had taken the position that
“now” under “federal jurisdiction” meant that the tribe had to be under federal
jurisdiction at the time the land was transferred in trust to the tribe. The Court
disagreed and held that “now” meant as of 1934, the year the Act was enacted into
law. This meant that many tribes, like the Narragansett tribe, the recipient of the trust
land in the case, would not qualify for a fee to trust land transfer. In finding the law
unambiguous, the Court managed to avoid both the Indian canon of statutory
construction and the Chevron doctrine under which an Agency’s interpretation of an
ambiguous statutory term should be given deference and be sustained a long as such
interpretation was permissible or reasonable.122
Justice Thomas, speaking for the Court first relied on the ordinary meaning of
the word “now.”123 He then mentioned the context of the IRA and thought it very
meaningful that in another section of the IRA, the Congress had used the words
“now existing or and hereafter established” when referring to an Indian
reservation.”124 Finally he mentioned one departmental letter which indicated that

116

534 U.S. 84, 99 (2001).
Id., at 100.
118
555 U.S. 379 (2009).
119
Id., at 397, stating “We hold that the term “now under Federal jurisdiction” in §479
unambiguously refers to those tribes that were under the federal jurisdiction of the United
States when the IRA was enacted in 1934.”
120
Id., at 413-414.
121
25 U.S.C 465.
122
Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
123
129 S. Ct. 1058, at 1064
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Id., at 1065.
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the Executive Department had a different construction of the Act at the time of
enactment than it has now.125
The rest of this section will explore three cases where there was no discussion
of the Indian canon but applying the canon would have made a difference.
In addition to Carcieri, Justice Thomas wrote two other majority opinions that
totally ignored the Indian canons. In Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa
Indians,126 the issue was whether the county could tax fee land owned by tribal
members within the Leech Lake Band's reservation. The Leech Lake reservation had
been allotted by the Nelson Act of 1889.127 That Act did not contain any language
that could be interpreted as an express congressional authorization to tax such lands.
Nevertheless, Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the County
could impose the tax because Congress had made its intent to allow such tax
“unmistakably clear” because “We have determined that Congress has
manifested such an intent when it has authorized reservation lands to be allotted in
fee to individual Indians, thus making the lands freely alienable and withdrawing
them from federal protection.”128
Justice Thomas was able to come to this conclusion by misinterpreting
precedents as endorsing the principle that whenever Congress allows Indians to
alienate their lands, it corresponds to an explicit endorsement of state taxation of
such lands. Thomas, as an avowed textualist, should have derived this “unmistakably
clear” meaning from the words of the statute or at least, from its structure. Instead,
he supported his conclusion by invoking a “rule” derived from another case that
dealt with another Act of Congress. 129 Justice Thomas’s reasoning can be
summarized as follows: First, other legislation, section 5 of the GAA, had been
interpreted in 1906 as allowing state taxation of Indian fee land because of its
alienability. Secondly, section 6 of the GAA was eventually amended (by the Burke
Act) to specifically allow state taxation. Therefore, congressional intent to allow
similar taxation in the 1889 Nelson Act could be inferred by importing a purpose
borrowed from the 1906 Burke Act. As one scholar noted, in his Cass County
opinion, Thomas the textualist had become Thomas, the purposivist. 130
The issue in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie,131 was whether the Venetie
Indian Community could tax a non-Indian entity for work done on tribal lands. The
State argued that because such lands were owned by the tribe in fee simple, they did
not qualify as being in Indian Country for the purpose of allowing tribal tax
This 1936 letter mentioned that the term “Indian” referred to all Indians who are
members of any recognized tribe that was under federal jurisdiction at the date of the Act,
129 S. Ct. at 1065.
126
524 U.S. 103 (1998).
127 25 Stat. 642
128
Id., at 110-11.
129
That rule was that whenever Congress allows Indians to freely alienate their lands,
it must intend the states to be able to tax such lands.
130
See Michael Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 Harv. L.
Rev. 4, 6 n.9 (1998).
131
522 U.S. 520 (1998).
125
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jurisdiction over non-members. The Court through Justice Thomas held that lands
set aside for Alaska Natives pursuant to Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANSCA),132 could not qualify as “Indian country” because such lands were not set
aside for a “dependent Indian Community” as that term is defined in 18 USC 1151.133
The Court emphasized that to qualify as Indian Country under 1151, such lands have
to be “validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such” and “under the
superintendence of the Federal Government.”134 In finding that these lands were not
under federal superintendence, Justice Thomas relied heavily on ANCSA’s
congressional findings according to which “the [ANCSA} settlement should be
accomplished rapidly, with certainty, …. without establishing any permanent
racially defined institutions [and]without creating a reservation system or lengthy
wardship or trusteeship.” 135 As other scholars have argued, there is nothing in
ANCSA indicating that Congress unequivocally intended these Native fee lands not
to be considered Indian Country for the purpose of 1151.136 Justice Thomas derived
that intent not as much from ANCSA as his understanding of much older preANCSA cases that indicated that all lands set aside for dependent Indian
communities had historically been under federal supervision.137
The final case being reviewed here where the Ambiguity canon should have
been used to reach the opposite conclusion is Adoptive Couple v, Baby Girl.138 The
major issue was whether the unmarried genetic father of an Indian child could
challenge the adoption of his child under section 1912 (f) and (d) of the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA).139 Adoptive Couple represents the quintessential case
132

43 U.S.C. 1601-1628.
Section 1151 was originally enacted to define Indian Country for the purpose of
establishing criminal jurisdiction on Indian lands. It now reads “the term “Indian country”,
as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under
the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent,
and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state,
and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including
rights-of-way running through the same.”
134
522 U.S. at 527.
135
Congressional findings and declaration of policy, 43 USCA § 1601.
136
see David M. Burton, Canons of Construction, Stare Decisis, and Dependent Indian
Communities: A test of Judicial Integrity, 16 Alaska L. Rev. 37, 52-53 (1999). (stating that
while ANCSA “does not demonstrate clear congressional intent for the Venetie Tribe's
ANCSA lands not to be “validly set aside for Indians.” As the Court recognized, Congress
intended to “end the sort of federal supervision over Indian affairs that had previously
marked federal Indian policy.” However, that does not preclude land from being set aside for
Indians in a manner that would reduce federal supervision over Indian affairs.”
137
522 U.S. at 528-530, relying on United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28
(1913); United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914); and United States v. McGowan, 302
U.S. 535 (1938).
138
570 U.S. 637 (2013).
139
92 Stat. 3069, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963.
133
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for application of the Indian Ambiguity canon. Yet, in this 5 to 4 decision, the
majority concluded that the “plain text of §§ 1912(f) and (d) makes clear that
neither provision applies in the present context.”140
Section 1912(f) provides that “[n]o termination of parental rights may be
ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt, ... that the continued custody of the child by the parent
or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the
child.” 141 Relying heavily on dictionary definitions of the words “continued
custody,” the Court held that 1912(f) did not apply because the father in this case
never had custody of the Indian child.142 The Court also stated that this interpretation
conformed with the “primary mischief” the Act was intended to prevent which was
“the unwarranted removal of Indian children from Indian families due to the cultural
insensitivity and biases of social workers and state courts.143 The dissent, on the
pother hand, argued that the meaning of the words should be derived from the whole
statute and the purpose of the law, not just plucked out of the statutory context.
Justice Sotomayor concluded
The majority, reaching the contrary conclusion, asserts baldly that “when
an Indian parent abandons an Indian child prior to birth and that child has
never been in the Indian parent's legal or physical custody, there is no
‘relationship’ that would be ‘discontinu[ed]’ ... by the termination of the
Indian parent's rights.” Says who? Certainly not the statute... In the face of
these broad definitions, the majority has no warrant to substitute its own
policy views for Congress' by saying that “no ‘relationship’ ” exists
between Birth Father and Baby Girl.144
In conclusion, since 1987, the Indian canon of statutory construction calling for a
liberal construction with ambiguities resolved in the Indians favor has only been
mentioned once in a majority opinion. Yet many cases, including Chickasaw,
Carcieri, Cass County, Venetie, and Adoptive Couple, should have reached contrary
results had the Court acknowledged that the statutes involved were ambiguous and
applied the Indian canon.

140

Id., at 656.
Section 1912 (f).
142
Id., at 647-648.
143
Id at 749. The Court also added that the legislative history of the ICWA “further
underscores that the Act was primarily intended to stem the unwarranted removal of Indian
children from intact Indian families.” Id.
144
570 U.S. 637, 675 (2013) (Justice Sotomayor dissenting).
141

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813569

22

FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
PART II: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE INDIAN CANONS AND BEYOND
A. The Textualist Perspective

I have already mentioned the Scalia perspective on rarely finding ambiguities
as posing a problem for the use of the Indian ambiguity canon.145 To this could be
added the fact that the first part of the canon calling for statute to be “liberally”
construed is bound to be a problem for textualist since the term is understood as
construing a statute so as to give the maximum effect to the purpose of the statute.
Almost by definition, textualists do not like to consider a statute’s “purpose” in order
to derive the “meaning” of the text. Yet, as Professor John Manning stated “although
textualists find it appropriate in cases of ambiguity to consult a statute's apparent
purpose or policy (provided that it is derived from sources other than legislative
history), they resist altering a statute's clear semantic import in order to make the
text more congruent with its apparent background purpose.146
One theme running in many of the Indian canons is a search, whether clear or
unequivocal, for congressional intent. One could think this would pose a problem
for textualists since they are allegedly opposed to interpreting statutes by looking for
congressional intent.
Textualist scholars like John Manning, however, have taken the position that
the very concept of legislative intent is just “a metaphor that invites interpreters to
think about how to attribute a decision to a complex, multiparty body that does not
have a mental state.”147 Although textualists do not believe in an actual or subjective
congressional intent, they do believe in “objectified intent” which is “the import that
a reasonable person conversant with applicable social and linguistic conventions
would attach to the enacted words.”148 So, the fact that the Indian canons are phrased
in term of a search for clear or unequivocal congressional intent should not be a
problem per se for textualists. To the extent that there is a problem, it seems to come
from the Justices’ reluctance to find ambiguities in cases such as Carcieri, Cass
County, Venetie, and Adoptive Couple.
Another potential problem for textualists is the use of substantive canons.149 As
Justice Connie Barrett stated in an Article written before she joined the Court,
Substantive canons are in significant tension with textualism… insofar as
their application can require a judge to adopt something other than most
textually plausible meaning of a statute. Textualists cannot justify the
application of substantive canons on the ground that they represent what
145
146

See supra at note……………..
John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419 439-440

2005).
John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 Colum L. Rev. 1911, 1913 (2015).
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, at 424.
149
See Anita s. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering substantive canons. 84 U. Chi. L. Rev.
825. (Empirically demonstrating that textualist Justices use substantive canons less often
than their purposivist counterparts.)
147
148

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813569

FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

23

Congress would have wanted… A judge applying a substantive canon
often exchanges the best interpretation of a statutory provision for a merely
bearable one.150
On the other hand, Justice Connie Barrett does not object to the use of substantive
canons when there are two equally plausible interpretations. Her concern is with the
use of substantive canons to allow courts to depart from the most normal
interpretation of the text.151 Thus, she identified as a major concern for textualists
the need to find the authority for a court to adopt an interpretation that is contrary to
the faithful agent model. However, Connie Barrett takes the position that canons
derived from the Constitution should be acceptable to textualists,152 because “[t]he
duty to enforce the Constitution may empower a judge not only to invalidate
congressional actions that violate constitutional norms, but also to resist
congressional actions that threaten those norms. The Judge need not serve
exclusively as Congress’s faithful agent because she serves a higher law.”153 In the
next section, I argue that the Indian canons could be viewed as constitutionally
inspired canons.
B. The Indian Canons’ Constitutional Connection
What does it mean for the Indian canons “to be rooted in the trust relationship”
and what does this fact implies for the application of the canons? Here, I will show
that the Indian Canon has a constitutional lineage because the trust doctrine has
constitutional roots. As Professor Carole Goldberg eloquently stated
The concept of a federal trust does draw on the text of the Constitution…
The textual source in the Constitution is article I, which differentiates
Indian tribes both from foreign nations and from states. This text required
the Marshall Court to identify precisely what kind of political bodies the

150
See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev.
109, 123-124 (2010). On the other hand, some leading textualists have acknowledged that
textualists “apply sufficiently well-settled canons of construction, including substantive
canons.” See Manning, Textualist and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. at 436.
151
Id at 123, stating “Substantive canons are in no tension with faithful agency insofar
as they are used as tie breakers between equally plausible interpretations of a statute.
Textualists have no difficulty taking policy into account when language is ambiguous.”
152
Id., at 111-112 (stating “to the extent a canon is constitutionally inspired, its
application does not necessarily conflict with the structural norms that constrain judges from
engaging in broad, equitable interpretation. Instead of pursuing undifferentiated social values
- however sound and desirable they may be - constitutionally inspired canons draw from an
identifiable, closed set of norms. As such, their effect on the legislative bargain is more
predictable.”
153
Id., at 169.
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tribes were; and the conclusion—that they were “domestic dependent
nations”—encompasses both the ideas of a trust and of sovereignty.154

Most scholars agree that the first official indication of the existence of a trust
relationship is Chief Justice Marshall’s famous description of the federal tribal
relationship in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia as being “akin to that of a guardian to
its ward. 155 In this Opinion, Chief Justice Marshall relied principally on three
arguments to come down with his description of tribes as being “domestic,
dependent nations.” First, “The Indian territory is admitted to compose a part of the
United States.”156 This assertion derives from the Court’s earlier case of Johnson v.
M’Intosh,157 where the Court held that the doctrine of discovery applied to Indian
nations.158 Second, ”They acknowledge themselves in their treaties to be under the
protection of the United States; they admit that the United States shall have the sole
and exclusive right of regulating the trade with them, and managing all their affairs
as they think proper.”159 Finally, the Chief Justice mentioned that the Commerce
Clause which empowers congress to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states, and with the Indian tribes,” makes a distinction between
foreign nations and Indian tribes because “In this clause they are as clearly
contradistinguished by a name appropriate to themselves, from foreign nations, as
from the several states composing the union. They are designated by a distinct
appellation.”160
Although the trust doctrine is currently viewed as beneficial by Indian
Nations,161 it has had a complicated and mixed history. That is because although it
can be a source of protection and duties owed by the United States to the Indian
nations, the doctrine was also, at some point in time, viewed as a source of federal
power allowing the United States to exercise plenary governmental control over
Indian tribes. Thus, in United States v. Kagama, the Court held that the United States
could assert criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed among tribal members and
154

39 UCLA L. Rev. 169, 190.
30 U.S. 1, 54 (1832).
156
Id., at 12.
157
21 U.S. 240, 253-54 (1823).
158
Under the doctrine, as interpreted and applied in Johnson v. M ‘Intosh, the United
States acquired “ultimate” title to the lands of Indian nations. See Robert J. Miller, Native
America, Discovered and Conquered 166 (2006) (tracing the roots of the trust relationship
to the doctrine of Discovery.)
159
30 U.S. at 12. One scholar agreed that the treaties are at the origin of the trust
relationship but took the position that the trust relationship comes more from the huge
transfer of land from the tribes to the United States that was made through those treaties. See
Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust
Doctrine Revisited, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 1471 (1994).
160
30 U.S. at 13.
161
See Reid Chambers, Compatibility of the Federal Trust Responsibility with SelfDetermination of Indian Tribes: Reflections on Development of the Federal Trust
Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 2005 No. 5 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found. Paper
No. 13A (2005).
155
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famously declared “The power of the general government over these remnants of a
race once powerful… is necessary to their protection… It must exist in that
government, because it never has existed anywhere else; because the theater of its
exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States; because it has never
been denied; and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.”162
In more modern times, the source of congressional power over Indian tribes has
migrated from the trust doctrine to the Constitution. 163 Thus, while comparing the
Interstate Commerce with the Indian Commerce Clauses, the Court mentioned that
“while the Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned with maintaining free trade
among the States …the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide
Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.”164 However,
the trust doctrine is still mentioned as s source of congressional plenary power. For
instance, in a 1974 case, although the Court stated that “The plenary power of
Congress to deal with the special problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and
implicitly from the Constitution itself,165 it also mentioned that congress’s broad
powers over Indian tribes was “based on a history of treaties and the assumption of
a ‘guardian-ward’ status, to legislate on behalf of federally recognized Indian
tribes.”166
In mentioning Indian tribes in the Commerce Clause along with other
sovereigns, the Constitution recognizes, implicitly at least, that Indian tribes possess
a certain degree of sovereignty. The Constitution does not, however, guarantee the
extent of this sovereignty,167 and the Court has undermined tribal sovereignty when
it held that the purpose of the Commerce Clause was to give plenary power to the
Congress over Indian tribes. 168 In that fashion, the trust relationship can be

162

118 U.S. 375 (1886).
Scholars have long debated the legitimacy and extent of the “plenary power” of
Congress over Indian Affairs. See for instance, Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian
Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1082-88 (2015), Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal
Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45, 73-94 (2012) Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme
Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 121, 132-33 (2006), Nell Jessup
Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 195, 228-36 (1984), Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for
Indian Tribes, 34 Ariz. St. L. J. 113 (2002).
164
Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989). Article I, s 8, cl. 3,
provides Congress with the power to ‘regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.’”
165
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-552 (1974).
166
Id., at 551,
167
See M. Alexander Pearl, Originalism and Indians, 93 Tulane L. Rev 269, 329-330
(2018) (stating, ”Indian tribes are mentioned in the Constitution, but the scope of their rights
and authorities are notably absent.”)
168
For an argument tying statutory interpretation to congressional overreach under the
plenary power doctrine, see David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation:
Conquest, Consent, and Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 Va. L. Rev. 403 (1994)
(stating “While the Constitution may provide Congress with legislative authority over Indian
affairs, it leaves unanswered how such statutes are to be interpreted. To answer that question,
163
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considered, just like federalism, an underenforced norm with constitutional roots. 169
For instance, although Indian tribes can sue the federal government for breach of
specific statutes creating trust duties,170 they have generally been denied the right to
sue the federal government for injunctive relief directing the government to enforce
the trust responsibility. 171 Similarly, while Tribes can sue the federal government
for monetary damages for taking vested property right without affording just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, 172 they cannot
challenge the power of Congress to regulate their tribal affairs or interfere with tribal
self-government. In other words, while tribes can sue the United States for violation
of other parts of the Constitution, they cannot allege that Congress has exceeded its
power under the Indian Commerce Clause. Professor Clinton once critically
observed that while there are external constitutional limits to congressional power
over Indian tribes, there are no internal limits within the Indian Commerce Clause.173
C. Searching for Congressional Intent to Interfere with Tribal Sovereignty

the Court must examine the nature, origin, and justification of Congress power over Indian
tribes.” Id., at 415.
169
As stated by Professors Eskridge and Frickey, “[st]ructural constitutional
protections, especially those of federalism, are underenforced constitutional norms. They are
essentially unenforceable by the Court as a direct limitation upon Congress's power, and are
best left to the political process. But the Court may have a legitimate role in forcing the
political process to pay attention to the constitutional values at stake, and super-strong clear
statement rules are a practical way for the Court to focus legislative attention on these
values.” Quasi Constitutional law, supra note 3, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 597.
170
United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 461 U.S. 206 (1983).
171
See Curtis Berkey, Rethinking the Role of the Federal Trust Responsibility in
protecting Indian Law and Resources, 83 Denver L. Rev. 1069, 1079 (2006) (stating that “In
the current hostile legal climate, arguments that the trust responsibility requires federal
agencies to act in the best interests of tribes, independent of their statutory duties, are likely
to be greeted with skepticism.” Besides Berkey, other scholars have also argued that Tribes
should be able to force the government to defend tribal trust resources. See for instance,
Mary Christina Wood, The Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands and
Resources Through Claims for Injunctive Relief against Federal Agencies, 39 Tulsa L. Rev.
355, 364-368 (2003). There are, however, no final Supreme Court decision on this issue and
scholars are still pushing arguments requiring enforcement of the trust duties. See Scott W.
Stern, Rebuilding Trust: Climate Change, Indian Communities, and a Right to Resettlement,
47 Ecology L.Q. 179 (2020).
172
See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 407-408 (1980), Hodel v. Irving,
481 U.S. 704 (1981).
173
Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision quest for a
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 77 (1993) (stating” There is, of course, a
considerable difference between managing affairs with the Indian tribes, as originally
contemplated by the constitutional phrase “commerce … with Indian tribes” and managing
the affairs of the Indian tribes and their members as contemplated by the plenary power
doctrine.” Id., at 120. See also, Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal
Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self Government, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 979 (1981).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813569

FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

27

In a recent case involving tribal sovereign immunity, after stating that the tribal
sovereign immunity canon represented a rule of construction reflecting “an enduring
principle of Indian law,” the Court added “Although Congress has plenary authority
over tribes, courts will not lightly assume that Congress in fact intends to undermine
Indian self-government.” 174 Similarly, the Santa Clara Court stated that in
construing Indian related statutes, courts should look for “clear” indication of
Congressional intent before a statute is construed to intrude on tribal sovereignty.175
The problem with looking for a “clear” intent to interfere with tribal self-government
is that “clear intent”” seems to be in eyes of the beholder. This Article takes the
position that the test to find an intent to interfere with tribal sovereignty should be
the same as the test requiring “unequivocal” expression of congressional intent
before tribal sovereign immunity can be abrogated by Congress. The tribal sovereign
immunity test was phrased in this manner because the Court borrowed from cases
deciding whether state sovereign immunity had been abrogated. Thus, in Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,176 the Court cited to two state sovereign immunity cases
to justify its “unequivocal expression of congressional intent” test for abrogation of
tribal sovereign immunity.177
While looking for clear indication of congressional intent may sound the same
as looking for “unequivocal” expression as is the case for abrogation of tribal
sovereign immunity, the fact is that courts have taken the sovereign immunity canon
seriously while basically ignoring the other.178 Under my proposed methodology, a
court interpreting a federal statute should first ask: Is our interpretation of the statute
interfering with tribal sovereignty? If the answer is yes, the next step would be to
look for unequivocal expression that Congress intended such interference. If the
answer is no, the court should interpret the statute so as not to interfere with such
sovereign rights.
In requiring Congress to be clear whenever it uses its plenary power to interfere
with the tribes’ sovereign rights, the Indian canons fulfill a role similar to the
federalist canons in that these federalist canons also aim at making sure that
Congress clearly intends to take action interfering with the states’ sovereignty. 179
174

Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. 782, 790 (2014).
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
176
Id.
177
Id., at 58. The two cases cited by the Court were United States v. Testan, 424 U.S.
392, 399, (1976), and United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4, (1969). However, since Santa
Clara Pueblo was decided, the test to find an abrogation of state sovereign immunity has
transformed itself into a super strong “clear Statement” rule. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
178
One commentator recently argued that in order for tribal sovereign immunity to be
abrogated, the text of the statute at issue should explicitly referred to Indian tribes and their
sovereign immunity. See Justin W. Aimonetti, Magic Words and original Understanding:
An Amplified Clear Statement Rule to Abrogate Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 2020 Pepperdine
L. Rev. 1 (2020).
179
In a noted article, Professors Eskridge and Frickey identified 5 such federalist
canons: 1. Rule Against Federal Conditions on State Administration of Federal/State
175
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The Court stated in United States v. Bond, “it is incumbent upon the federal courts
to be certain of Congress's intent before finding that federal law overrides' ” the
“usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers.” 180 As explained by
Professor Manning, federalist canons preserve this balance “by presuming that,
absent a clear statement to the contrary, acts of Congress do not intrude upon the
states either by regulating state functions or displacing state law.” 181 The Indian
canons provide a similar role in ensuring that tribal rights are protected from
congressional plenary power until there is a clear and manifest intent from Congress
to interferes with such rights.182 My proposed canon protecting tribal sovereignty
attempts to protect under-enforced norms such as tribal self-government and the
trust relationship by making sure that even though the Court declared that Congress
has plenary power over Indian tribes, this power is only enforced sparingly and
willfully.
To justify the proposed analogy to the federalist canons, statutes being subject
to the tribal sovereignty canon should come into play only when federal statutes
interfere with tribal sovereignty. The question is, therefore, what kind of statutes are
those? The Indian Civil Rights Act, 183 at issue in Santa Clara v. Martinez, 184
provides a good example of such a statute since it imposed on tribal governments
the duty to protect rights similar to those found in the Bill of Rights. 185
One test attempting to define what kind of governmental actions infringe on
tribal sovereignty was initially devised by the Court with respect to states’ attempt
to extend their jurisdiction in Indian Country. Thus, in 1959, the Court in Williams
Programs with Federal Funding 2. Super-Strong Rule Against Congressional Waiver of
States' Eleventh Amendment Immunity from Suit in Federal Court 3. Super-Strong Rule
Against Congressional Regulation of Core State Functions 4. Presumption Against Statutory
Regulation of Intergovernmental Taxation 5. Presumption Against Applicability of Federal
Statutes to State and Local Political Processes. See Eskridge and Frickey, Quasi
Constitutional Law, supra at note 3, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593.
180
572 U.S. 844, 858–59 (2014).
181
John Manning, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 399, 407–08. (citing to Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 460 (1991), for the proposition that “if Congress intends to alter the usual
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must make its
intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”
182
See Scott Hall, supra at note 15, The Indian Law Canon of Construction, 37 Conn.
L. Rev. at 541-542. Philip P. Frickey, Doctrines, Context, Institutional Relationships, and
Commentary, The Malaise of Federal Indian Law Through the Lens of Lone Wolf, 38 Tulsa
L. Rev 5, 29 (2002) (stating that since Congress controlled Indian affairs, “the Court's role
was simply to insure that pre-existing tribal rights were not lost through inadvertent actions
by Congress or by the tribes themselves.”)
183
See Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303.
184
436 U.S. 49 (1978)
185 For more background on the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, see generally ICRA
Reconsidered: New Interpretations of Familiar Rights, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1709
(2016); see
also Mark
D.
Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of QuasiConstitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDH
AM L. REV. 479 (2000).
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v. Lee formulated a test for deciding the extent of state jurisdiction in Indian Country,
stating, “Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always
been whether the state actions infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them.”186 The problem with borrowing this test for
our purpose is that this test was soon modified when the Court in 1973 announced a
new test, stating:
The trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a
bar to state jurisdiction, and toward the reliance on federal preemption.
The modern cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notion of Indian
sovereignty and to look instead at the applicable treaties and statutes which
defines the limits of state power.187
Therefore, there are no examples where the Supreme Court has applied this test
except for its application in Williams v. Lee.188 The Court in Williams held that state
jurisdiction could not be extended so as to allow a non-Indian to sue a tribal member
in a state court over a debt contracted on the reservation because this would
“undermine the authority of tribal courts over Reservation Affairs and hence would
infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.”189
One could also borough from the area of the law attempting to determine if a
federal law of general applicability not mentioning Indian tribes should nevertheless
be enforced on Indian reservations. 190 There are no controlling Supreme Court
precedents on this issue. Under the majority view, established by the 9th Circuit,
there is a presumption that general federal regulatory laws apply to Indian
reservations.191 This presumption can be rebutted, however, if application of the law
would interfere with “exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural
matters,” or interfere with treaty rights. 192 If the presumption is rebutted, courts
following this approach have required clear evidence of congressional intent to
apply the law to the tribes.193 Another approach, favored by the D.C. Circuit, would

186

Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
the Court eventually adopted a balancing-of-the-interest test, holding that the Indian
preemption inquiry is “not dependent on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal
sovereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal and
tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the
exercise of state authority would violate federal law.
188
358 U.S. 217 (1959).
189
Id., at 220.
190
For a comprehensive summary of the law in this area, see Alex Tallchief Skibine,
Practical Reasoning and the Application of General Federal Regulatory Laws to Indian
Nations, 22 Wash. & Lee J. of Civ. Rights and Soc. J. 123 (2016).
191
Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985).
192
Id., at 1116.
193
This approach has been followed in the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits. See Skibine, Practical Reasoning, at 126.
187
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only require clear evidence of congressional intent if the general federal law
interfered with the “traditional attributes of self-government.”194
In NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 195 The Tenth Circuit disagreed with an
approach focusing on whether the general federal law interfered with strictly
intramural aspects of tribal sovereignty. The Tenth Circuit viewed the central
question as whether Congress in enacting such laws of general applicability, had the
intent to preempt tribal sovereign powers in the area covered by the general federal
law at issue.196 After stating that “in addition to broad authority over intramural
maters such as membership, tribes retain sovereign authority to regulate economic
activity within their own territory,”197 the Pueblo of San Juan Court concluded that
“[p]reempting tribal laws divests tribes of their retained sovereign authority . . . In
the absence of clear evidence of congressional intent, therefore, federal law will not
be read as stripping tribes of their retained sovereign authority to pass right-to-work
laws and be governed by them.”198
The Tenth Circuit also announced that the burden to show such intent was on
the federal agency and not the Pueblo,199 and went on to explain why the burden to
show a congressional intent to preempt tribal sovereignty fell on the Federal Agency.
After asserting that although Congress can divest tribal powers, divestiture was
disfavored as a matter of national policy, the Court mentioned that whenever tribal
sovereignty was at stake, the trust relationship cautioned that “we tread lightly in the
absence of clear indications of legislative intent.”200 Finally, the court mentioned the
federal policy of encouraging tribal self-government.201
I believe that, when determining whether the Indian canons should apply to a
federal statute, a more generous definition of tribal self-government, as was adopted
in Williams v. Lee and Pueblo of San Juan, should be adopted. While there are some
judicially imposed limits on tribal jurisdiction over non-members,202 the Court has
never restricted tribal sovereignty to “traditional attributes” of sovereignty, let alone
to purely intramural aspects of self-government.
The final section of this Article will address the kind of statutes where the
Indian canons should be applicable.
194

San Manuel Bingo v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
276 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2002).
196
Id., at 1191.
197
Id., at 1192-93.
198
Id., at 1195.
199
Id., at 1190.
200
Id., at 1195, (quoting from Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978).
201
Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit also raised the “ambiguity” canon, stating that
“ambiguities in federal law have been construed generously in order to comport with tribal
notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence,” and
reiterated that “a well-established canon of Indian law is that doubtful expressions of
legislative intent must be resolved in favor of the Indians.” Id., at 1191
202 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981), Plains Commerce Bank v.
Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008).
195
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D. The Extent of the Indian Canons’ Applicability
There were five Indian statutory interpretation cases at the Court since 1987
that did not involve Indian specific statutes.203 The Tribal interests lost all five and
the Court did not apply any of the Indian canons. For some, the Indian canons are
only applicable to statutes enacted for the benefit of Indians. As stated earlier, the
Court in Negonsott v. Samuels stated “It is not entirely clear to us that the Kansas
Act is a statute “passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes.” 204 The question
this section addresses is how courts should determine the applicability of an Indian
canon.
I think there is arguably a difference between applying the “ambiguity” canon
to all statutes and applying that canon when the statute interferes with tribal
sovereignty where the tribal sovereignty canon also comes into play. The ambiguity
canon can be traced to the treaties but was first initially applied in the interpretation
of statutes enacted pursuant to the trust relationship. 205 The question here is whether
the test should focus, as the Negonsott Court indicated, on whether a statute was
enacted for the “benefit of tribes.” I think this determination would be too subjective.
Determining whether some statute was enacted “for the benefit” of the Indians could
be problematic. Take the General Allotment Act (GAA) of 1887 for instance.206 Just
about all Indian tribes were against the policy of Allotment and thought the GAA
would be detrimental to Indian tribes.207 Yet, many white politicians of the times
argued that the Act was being enacted for the benefit of Indians because its goal was
to transform Indians into farmers so that they could more quickly be assimilated in
the non-Indian mainstream society.208
Rather than determining whether the statute actually “benefit” the Indians or
the tribes, the canon should be extended to all statutes that were enacted pursuant to
congress under its Indian Commerce Clause power. As noted earlier in this article,
the ambiguity canon has historically been tied to the trust relationship. It is,
therefore, rational to assume that, in cases containing ambiguities, Congress would
have wanted the statute to be interpreted to the benefit of Indians.
The Sovereignty Canon, on the other hand, should not be limited to statutes
snated solely pursuant to the Indian Commerce Power. Take for instance federal
203
These five cases are Mach-E-B-Nash-She-Wish Band v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209
(2012). Inyo Cty. v. Paiute Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701 (2003). El Paso Natural Gas v.
Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999), Amoco Prod. v. Southern Ute Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999),
and Amoco Prod. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
204
507 U.S. 99, 110 (1993). The Court went on not applying the Indian canon because
it found the Kansas Act was clear in giving Kansas jurisdiction over the crime. See discussion
supra, at n….
205
See discussion supra at notes 33-43.
206
24 Stat. 388 (1887).
207
See Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property, Rights, and the Myth
of Common Ownership, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1559, 1603-1608 (2001).
208
On the General Allotment Act, see Judith V. Royster, the Legacy of Allotment, 27
Ariz. L. J. 1 (1995).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813569

32

FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

laws of general applicability. These laws are enacted pursuant to the interstate
commerce power. Yet, application of such laws to Indian tribes may still interfere
with tribal self-government or, in other words, with “the right of Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them,.”209 Both the tribal sovereignty canon, a canon
that asks whether there is a clear or unequivocal expression of congressional intent
to interfere with tribal sovereign rights, as well as the ambiguity canon should be
applicable to such statutes of general applicability.210
As the Supreme Court stated, “Ambiguities in federal law have been construed
generously in order to comport with these traditional notions of sovereignty and with
the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence.”211 The Tribal sovereignty
canon is based on Congress’s relatively unchecked plenary power over Indian
nations.212 This plenary power can be exercised by Congress not only under the
Indian Commerce Clause but pursuant to other powers given to Congress under the
constitution. The normative reason for the sovereignty canon is to ensure that in
using its plenary power, Congress has willfully and intentionally decided to abrogate
tribal sovereign rights. It does not, therefore, matter whether Congress was acting
pursuant to its Indian Commerce power or other more general constitutional power.
Thus, several courts have applied the ambiguity canon along with the tribal
sovereignty canon to federal laws of general applicability.213
CONCLUSION
Through an analysis of treaty and statutory interpretation cases decided in the
last thirty years or so, this Article has shown that the Court is generally inclined to
apply the Indian canons of construction to treaty interpretation and treaty abrogation
cases as well as cases involving abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity. However,
the Court is much less willing to apply the canon calling for clear legislative intent
before a statute is construed to interfere with tribal sovereignty. Similarly, the Court
almost never relies on the canon requiring statutes enacted for the benefit of Indians
to be liberally construed with ambiguities resolved to the benefit of the Indians.
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See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1958).
Other scholars have also endorsed the view that the Indian canons should be
applicable beyond laws enacted strictly to regulate or protect Indians. See, for instance,
Bryan H. Widenthal, Federal Labor Laws, Indian Sovereignty, and the Canons of
Construction, 86 Or. L. Rev. 413, 434-452 (2012)
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White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980).
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See discussion at notes 168-177.
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See NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1191 and discussion supra at note
193, See also Buchwald Capital Advisors v. Sault St. Marie Tribe (In re Greektown Holdings
III), 917 F.3d at 451, at 463 (6 th Cir. 2019) (considering whether the Bankruptcy Code had
abrogated the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes in light of section 11 U.S.C 101(27)
abrogating sovereign immunity to “governmental unit”, and Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of
Indians, 836 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2016) (considering whether the Fair and Accurate Credit
Reporting Act (FACTA), had abrogated tribal sovereign immunity.
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The Article has argued that these canons have constitutional roots and textualist
jurists should not be reluctant to use them. Furthermore, textualism, as a
methodology could be helpful to tribal interests in that Congressional intent to
abrogate tribal rights should only be derived from the text of the statute and not extra
textual material. Finally, this Article has argued that the unequivocal expression of
congressional intent test that has been applied to abrogation of tribal sovereign
immunity should also be applied to intent to interfere with tribal sovereign rights.
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